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CASE COMMENTS
FEDERAL IMPACT FUND DEDUCTION IN
STATE SCHOOL APPROPRIATION FORMULAE
The Congress has authorized, under Public Law 874, federal aid
to local school districts in which there are substantial federal activities.
Federal activities create a two-fold financial burden in local school
districts. Local revenues are reduced as a result of the acquisition of
real property by the United States and enrollment is increased as a
result of education being provided for the children of federal em-
ployees.1 The federal payments are supposed to ease the burden of
these "impacted areas." However, fifteen states off-set these federal
impacted area payments by reducing their state aid to those local
educational agencies that receive federal funds.2 The Virginia off-set
procedure was recently tested in Shepheard v. Godwin.3
The Virginia Appropriation Act of 1966 provides for two types of
state aid to local educational agencies: the state basic share and the
state supplementary share.4 The state basic share is an allocation on
the basis of the salaries paid by the local school board, which by the
1966 Act is equal to sixty percent of the minimum salary cost.5 No
deduction of federal funds is made .from this state basic share. The
second type of aid, the state supplementary share, is arrived at by
comparing all the income to the local agency with the projected mini-
mum expenses for school operations during the year, any deficit being
the amount of the state supplementary share. More particularly, the
state supplementary share is computed in a three step process.
The first step is a determinaion of total income by adding to-
gether the three major sources of revenue to the local school agency:
The state basic share; the local share6 and one-half of any federal funds
provided for local operating expenses. The second step is the computa-
'2o U.S.C. § 236 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966).
-U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS, 3878 (1966).
828o F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968).
VA. Acrs OF ASSEMBLY ch. 719, § 3, Item 459 (1966); renewed in House Bill
No. 20, § 3, Item 564 (Feb. 28, 1968).
"'I]he cost of salaries paid teachers in State aid teaching positions, in accord-
ance with the minimum salary schedule." VA. Acrs or ASSEMBLY ch. 719, § 3, Item
459(b)(4) (1966).6"[A]n amount equivalent to a uniform tax levy of sixty cents (6oc) per one
hundred dollars (Soo) of true values of local taxable real estate and public service
corporation property within a county or city." VA. Ac=S OF ASSEMBLY ch. 719,
§ 3, Item 459 (b)(6) (1966) (emphasis added).
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tion of the minimum program cost by adding the minimum salary cost
for the teachers in the local district together with a minimum allow-
ance of $ioo for each pupil in average daily attendance.7 The third
step is the comparison of total income arrived at in step one, with
the minimum program cost from step two, any deficit being the
amount of the state supplementary share. The purpose is to establish
a minimum amount that should be spent within the local district and
then by the use of this state supplementary share to insure that the
funds are available.8 The inclusion of the federal funds in total
income will result in a reduced state supplementary share in step three.
This inclusion of the federal funds in the state formula and the result-
ant reduction in state aid formed the basis for the plaintiff's consti-
tutional objection in Shepheard,9 decided in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
The plaintiffs, property owners in the City of Norfolk, contended
that the inclusion of federal impact funds in arriving at the state
supplementary share had the same effect as a deduction of the federal
payments and thus violated the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. 0 The plaintiffs alleged that the state formula
frustrated the intent and purpose of the federal law in that the school
districts were not receiving the full amount of the additional federal
funds because the state supplementary share was being reduced by
one-half of the amount of these funds. After an examination of the
legislative history and the "[T]erms, pattern and policy of the act
[Public Law 874],""1 the court held that the Virginia law did violate
the supremacy clause.
The court went on to find item 459(c)(8) 1 2 of the Virginia law
unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection of the laws
clause.' 3 This provision provided that in the event the availability of
federal funds for local expenses is conditioned upon their being ex-
cluded from total income in the state formula, the average daily attend-
TA. Acrs OF ASSEMBLY ch. 719, § 3, Item 4 5 9 (b)(i) (1966).8As an example of this formula in actual application for the City of Norfolk:
$10,415,566 (total cost of salaries) + 5,202,500 (average daily attendance of 52,025
X $100) = $15,6s8,o66 (minimum program cost). $1,35o,ooo (federal funds) +
6,864,696 (local share) + 6,249,340 (state basic share) = $14,464,036 (total income).
$15,618,o66 (minimum program cost) - 14,464,036 (total income) = $1,154,o3o
(state supplementary share). Brief for Plaintiff Appendix "B", Shepheard v.
Godwin, 28o F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968).
"28o F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968).
'0U.S. CONST. art. VI.
12 8o F. Supp. at 874.
1WA. Acrs OF ASSEMBLY ch. 719, § 3, Item 459(c)(8) (1966); renewed in House
Bill No. 20, § 3, Item 564(c)(9) (Feb. 28, 1968).
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § i.
CASE COMMENTS
ance of federal employees' children should also be excluded from the
computation of the minimum program cost. The effect of this pro-
vision was that if the federal income to the local district was to be
excluded from the state formula, then the expenses attributable to
the federal employees' children would also be excluded.
In applying the supremacy clause to invalidate state legislation,
state law is presumed valid unless it clearly conflicts with a federal
law.14 State police power regulation can conflict with federal law in
one of two ways: either Congress's intent is to totally control the area
leaving no room for state legislation;15 or there is no such intent
but a state law with a specific purpose produces a result inconsistent
with the clear and manifest objective of a federal law on the same
subject.' 6 This presumption of constitutionality is also applicable to
constitutional objections based on the equal protection clause as the
Supreme Court pointed out in Fort Smith Light & Traction Company
v. Board of Improvement.17 The Court said: "[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment does not require the uniform application of legislation to
objects that are different, where those differences may.be made the
rational basis of legislative discrimination."'s
This presumption of constitutionality is applicable to state school
legislation since the courts have recognized that school regulation
falls within the police power of a state. 19 The question then to be
considered is whether there is a conflict between Public Law 874 and
a state apportionment formula which in effect deducts federal aid
in arriving at state aid to education. It would seem that the basis for
"Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 392 (1895); Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Holmes, 32 F. Supp. 964, 984 (D. Mont. 1940); Carolene Prods. Co. v. Mahoney,
294 F. 902, 904 (D. Mass. 1923).
"R5ice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona ex. rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945); see Penn Dairies, Inc. v.
Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
'"Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945).
17-74 U.S. 387, 391 (1927).
"This doctrine has been expanded to validate state voting apportionment laws
which in fact result in minor inequities. In MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281
(1948) the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois law that required a candidate of a
new party to obtain two hundred signatures from each of at least fifty of that
state's one hundred and two counties in order to be listed on the ballot in a
state-wide election. The inequity arose in that fifty-two percent of the state's
population resided in Cook County alone.
"See Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899). The court in
Cumming stated: "Mhe education of the people in schools maintained by state
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective states....1" 75 U.S. 528, 545
(1899); see Davis v. County School Board, 1o3 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D. Va. 1952),
rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 532
(E.D. S.C. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 294 (1952).
1968]
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any conflict would be that the state law produces a result inconsistent
with the objective of the federal law. This assumption is founded on
those provisions of Public Law 874 which clearly show that it was
not the intent of Congress to control all aid and thus leave no room
for state legislation.
2 0
Since its passage in 1950, the prevailing theme of the Federal Act
has been one of equality in taxation and in education. The legislative
history clearly shows that the impacted communities had raised prop-
erty assessments and taxes for school purposes to the legal maximum.
At the same time the students in these areas were not receiving normal
school services. The purpose of the Act was to alleviate these condi-
tions and supply equal benefits to all children within a state. 21 This
theme of equality is illustrated by the manner in which the funds
are allocated. To determine the amount of federal aid to an im-
pacted district, a comparable district within the state which has
little or no federal activity is chosen. The local contribution in the
comparable district is divided by the number of students in average
daily attendance in that district. The resulting figure is then multi-
plied by the number of children who reside on federal property,
plus one-half of those who do not reside on federal property, but
-'U.S.C. § 236 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1966). Justice Douglas in Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) outlined two situations where the
courts could assume that Congress' intent in passing legislation was to preempt the
entire field: "The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject." Id. at 230 (citations omitted).
Chief Justice Hughes discussed the alternative to total preemption in Kelly
v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (937): "There is no constitutional rule
which compels Congress to occupy the whole field. Congress may circumscribe its
regulation and occupy only a limited field. When it does so, state regulation out-
side that limited field and otherwise admissable is not forbidden or displaced....
[T]he exercise by the State of its police power, which would be valid if not
superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict
is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently
stand together.'" Id. at so.
Attempts have been made to get the Congress to establish definite preemption
standards: "No act of Congress shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to occupy the field in which such Act operates, to the
exclusion of all State laws on the same subject matter, unless such Act contains
an express provision to that effect, or unless there is a direct and positive con-
flict between such Act and a State law so that the two cannot be reconciled or
consistently stand together." H.R. 3, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). This Bill passed
the House but not the Senate. For a general discussion of the standards of pre-
emption see Note, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
2H.R. REP. No. 2287, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
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whose parents are employed there.22 This method of allocation at-
tempts to assure that the impacted area will have available funds
equal to the non-impacted area, thus assuring a comparable educa-
tion.
Neither this Act nor the subsequent amendments, however, have
shown a specific intent that federal aid should not be deducted in
state apportionment formulas. In 1965 Congress amended Public
Law 874 by adding Title II which provides funds to local agencies
for aid in educating the children of low income families.2 3 A section
of this new title provides that, in the event the state deducts the
federal aid in allocating state aid, the federal payments are to cease.
2 4
If this amendment applied to impacted area funds rather than to
children of low income families, it would seem that Congress had
indeed shown an intent that this deduction of federal funds should
not be made under any circumstances.
The House of Representatives, in its committee report of August
1966, recognized that this deduction from state aid to the impacted
school areas was being made and proposed an amendment to Title
I of Public Law 874. In reference to the deduction the report said:
"This is a direct contravention to congressional intent."25 that being
to assure no greater property tax burden on the impacted areas than
on the non-impacted areas and to provide a level of education equal
to the non-impacted areas within the state. The subsequent amend-
ment of 1966 provided that if state aid was reduced the impact funds
should be reduced in the same proportion. However, this reduction
in federal aid, unlike the provision of the 1965 amendment, was to
be at the discretion of the Federal Commissioner, who could waive or
reduce it whenever exceptional circumstances existed.2 Since the
1966 amendment dealing with impacted area funds included no such
absolute provision as was found in the 1965 amendment, then perhaps
there is indeed a different overriding theme to Title I of Public Law
874.
The Virginia law or any other state apportionment law must be
considered, then, in light of the basic purpose of the Federal Act,
reinforced by the flexibility of the 1966 amendment to that Act. If
the deduction of federal aid in the state apportionment formula re-
sults in an increased burden on the property owners in the impacted
areas through higher property taxes or results in unreasonable dis-
'2O U.S.C. § 238d (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966).
20o U.S.C. § 241 (Supp. II, 1966).
2 id. § 241g.
U.S. CODE CONG. 9- AD. NEWs, 8874, 8878 (1966).
20 U.S.C. § 24od (Supp. II, 1966).
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parities in the allocation of state aid to local districts, it would seem
to violate the intent of Public Law 874.
The table below has been prepared to determine the actual effect
of the deduction upon the local city districts in Virginia.
Income Sources to Local City School Districts
[All figures are dollars per pupil with the exception of the City levy,

































































Source: All figures with the exception of the city levy have been
computed from the information in, Brief for Plaintiff, Appendix "B",
Shepheard v. Godwin, 28o F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968). The source
of the city levies is DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION, COMMONWEALTH OF
VA., LOCAL TAX RATES TAX YEAR 1967, at 11 (1967).
Certain conclusions can be drawn from the information available
on city real estate taxes within the State. The average city levy is
S2.82 per one hundred dollars of assessed value. The average for the
impacted communities is $2.62, while that for the non-impacted cities
is $3.02. These statistics indicate that the property owner in an im-
pacted community is not bearing any greater burden than the owner
